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IN RE WILL OF PRITCHARD
Carolina court held that after-born children could partici-
pate in property in which there was an outstanding life
interest but not in present interests in other property cov-
ered by the residuary gift. The theory behind their de-
cision is that the testator did not anticipate such a situation
and that any attempt to determine his intention would re-
sult in a fiction.
Two principles are generally considered in such cases;
first, avoiding inconvenience through an early distribution
of the estate; and second, letting in as many children as
possible consistent with this principle of convenience. Al-
lowing the after-born children to share in the future inter-
ests included in the residue, works out a satisfactory
compromise between these two principles. No inconven-
ience results because all property which can be distributed
at the testator's death is immediately divided among the
then existing class members, the property in which after-
born children are allowed to participate being incapable
of distribution at that time. As to these future interests,
the class is closed when the preceding estate ends as that
is the earliest time at which the interest can be distributed.
Since such a method of distribution does not violate this
rule of convenience, the principle of letting in as many
members as possible should govern. Thus, the decree in
the present case is based on a sound principle which has
met with approval in several articles and textbooks.10
ADMISSIBILITY OF FOREIGN WILL TO PROBATE
In re Will of Pritchard1
The testator, a resident of West Virginia, and at no
time a resident of Maryland, died in Florida on April 1,
1939. Shortly thereafter, a will (dated 1911) and two
codicils (the first dated 1915, the second not dated) were
probated in West Virginia. Later, a certain document
was offered for probate to the Orphans' Court of Baltimore
City. This document was found in a safe-deposit box in
102 SIMiu, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) 140; Warren, Future Interests
(1921) 34 Harv. L. Rev. 6.39; Casner, Increase in the Class Membership
(1937) 51 Harv. L. Rev. 254, 279.
'Superior Court of Baltimore City, per Niles, J., Baltimore Daily Record,
November 26, 1940.
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Baltimore City. It was dated 1936; was entirely in the
handwriting of the testator,- and constituted a gift to M
of certain shares of stock, valued at approximately
$30,000. The shares were not mentioned in the previously
probated will and codicils; these contained merely certain
specific legacies and a residuary clause. The Orphans'
Court denied probate on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
and the petitioner appealed to the Superior Court of Bal-
timore City in accordance with Article 5, Section 69 of
the Maryland Code. Held: Reversed. The Orphans'
Court had jurisdiction to accept the document for original
probate.
In reaching this result, the Superior Court confined
itself to the question of the existence of jurisdiction, ex-
pressly eliminating from consideration any question of
"whether or not the Orphans' Court, if it had discretion,
had properly exercised it". On the limited point, the
Court thoroughly analyzed the applicable Maryland stat-
utes, existing Maryland authority, and the state of author-
ity elsewhere. Beginning with the Maryland statutes,
the Court quoted the applicable sections,8 and concluded
from them: First, that the shares given to M by the paper
were subject to administration in Baltimore City, under
the provisions of Art. 93, Sec. 15, since they were found
there, and since they formed a "considerable part" of the
testator's personal estate; second, that therefore the paper
might be probated in Baltimore City, under the provisions
of Art. 93, Sec. 356, since the words "any will" contained in
this section mean "any writing recognized as a will by
Maryland", and not "any will made by a resident of Mary-
land";4 third, that the provisions of Sec. 350 of Art. 93,
which allow probate of certain types of foreign wills, do
not, by failing to include the type of foreign will at issue
2 Both the Orphans' Court and the Superior Court assumed that the
paper was a valid holographic will under the law of West Virginia.
I Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Secs. 15, 350, and 356.
' The conclusion that the words "any will" meant "any will made by a
resident of Maryland" was one of the major reasons for the refusal of
probate by the Orphans' Court, which analogized the "any will" words of
Art. 93, Sec. 356 to the "any administrator" words of Art. 93, Sec. 125.
The words of Sec. 125 admittedly mean "any administrator appointed in
Maryland", since Sec. 125 purports to regulate the conduct of adminis-
trators, and such regulation by Maryland is possible only in the case of a
domestic administrator. However, in the principal case, the Superior
Court denied that the analogy bad any controlling effect; stating that the
Maryland statutes in several places recognize foreign wills, and nowhere
show an intention to exclude them, and that therefore there is no sound
basis for limiting the words of Sec. 356 so as to exclude such wills made
by non-residents.
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here, restrict the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court to the
enumerated situations.'
To reach its result, the Court had to dispose of a state-
ment, found in the case of Lindsay v. Wilson, which was
quoted by the Orphans' Court to support its refusal of
probate: ". . . If the testator was not originally domiciled
in Maryland, there is no provision in this statute for pro-
bate in this State, but then those interested in property
can procure a copy and have it recorded here under Sec-
tion 347 above referred to."" This statement, apparently
contra to the decision of the Superior Court, was held to
be not controlling, for the reasons that it was merely dic-
tum in the Lindsay case, and that it was merely a state-
ment that the particular section7 there under construction
had no provision for probate of a non-resident's will, but
was not authority for the proposition that there was no
such provision in other statutes.8
The Court then reviewed the out-of-state authorities,
and found that the majority of them supported its con-
clusions that jurisdictional power was not lacking,9 and
that the statutory provision for the admission of foreign
probate records0 did not preclude original admission."
'The Court said that the purpose of Section 350 was first to validate
foreign wills according to the laws of either (1) Maryland, (2) the place
where executed, (3) the testator's domicil; and 8econd to apply the laws
of Maryland to foreign wills made by persons originally domiciled in
Maryland. As pointed out in Lindsay v. Wilson, 103 Md. 252, 269, 63 A.
566, (1906), this section obviously does not provide for validation and
probate of a foreign will made by one who was never a resident of Mary-
land-but it does not follow that this omission was intended to deny
jurisdiction of such wills to the Orphans' Courts. This is especially true
in view of the fact that this section would apply even to such a will If,
as in this case, it were presumed to have been valid by the law of the
testator's domicil.
8103 Md. 252, 269, 63 A. 566, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 408 (1906), with Italics
supplied. The reference to "section 347" is to the Code of 1904. It Is now
Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 369.
7 At the time the Lindsay case was decided, the statute was Md. Code
(1904) Art. 93, Sec. 327, now, Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 350.
'The principal case is a direct holding that such provision does exist
in other statutes, namely, Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Secs. 15, 356. This
result was forecast and approved by a note to the case of Rabe v. Mc-
Allister, 177 Md. 97, 8 A. (2d) 922 (1939); in (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 400,
405-406.
9 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, Secs. 467, 469. See an extensive note
in 119 A. L. R. 491.
10 Md. Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 369.
11 Thompson v. Parnell, 81 Kan. 119, 105 P. 502 (1909) ; Woodfin v. Union
Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 174 Tenn. 367, 125 S. W. (2d) 487 (1939) :
Varner v. Bevil, 17 Ala. 286 (1850); THOMPsON ON WILLS, Sec. 29; 1
ScHouLER. WILS, 467. Contra: Eaton's Will, 186 Wis. 124, 202 N. W.
309 (1925) ; In Re Corning, 154 Mich. 474, 124 N. W. 514 (1910). See also
(1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 400, 405-406 for a discussion of this argument.
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The objection was also made that granting of probate
in Maryland would be a denial of full faith and credit to
the West Virginia probate. This was answered by the state-
ment that the full faith and credit clause requires recogni-
tion of the result of a foreign litigation of the same subject
matter, and has no application if the subject matter of the
domestic suit has not been litigated at all in the foreign
state. Here, this was unquestionably the case. The paper
offered for probate in Maryland had never been so offered
in West Virginia, and the courts of that state had never
adjudicated the question of its admissibility to probate.
Therefore, in respect to this paper, there was no decree of
a sister state to which the full-faith-and-credit clause could
apply.
Finally, the Court stated that the probate of a second
will is not precluded by the probate of a first will, because
probate merely establishes prima facie that the paper is a
testamentary document, and is not an adjudication of the
validity and legal effect of the paper.12 In its conclusion,
the Court felt that its view was consistent with the word-
ing of the Maryland statutes, and with one of the general
policies of testamentary law, which is to give effect if
possible to the intentions of the testator, no matter whether
his will was executed in Maryland or elsewhere.
This decision, standing squarely for the rule that Mary-
land Orphans' Courts have power to admit the wills of
non-residents to original probate, appears to answer a
troublesome point which had previously been left unan-
swered by both cases an statutes. 3 Whether the answer is
permanent will of course depend mainly on the weight to
be given it as an opinion of the Superior Court. More than
normal weight might result from the fact that it repre-
sented the final disposition of the particular case because
of the peculiar nature of appeal involved. This type of
appeal14 was created, and is governed, by Section 69 of
12 Bradley v. Bradley, 119 Md. 645, 652-653, 87 A. 390 (1912) ; Decker v.
Fahrenholtz, 107 Md. 515, 518-519, 72 A. 339 (1908) ; Rabe v. McAllister,
177 Md. 97, 105, 8 A. (2d) 922 (1939) ; 34 WORDS AND PHRASES, 59-61.
1s See Note (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 400.
14 Baldwin v. Hopkins, 172 Md. 219, 227-228, 191 A. 565, 569 (1937) states
that there are three possible appeals from the Orphans' Courts: (1) appeal
direct to the Court of Appeals Md. Code (1939) Art. 5, Sec. 64 (this is the
usual method) ; (2) appeal to the Circuit Court of the county under Md.
Code (1939) Art. 93, Sec. 254, restricted to controversies arising in connec-
tion with allegations of concealment of assets by an administrator or other
person, or of omissions by an administrator from the inventory or list of
debts, for recent interpretation of this, see Baker v. Forsythe, 16 A. (2d)
921 (Md. 1940) ; (3) appeal to the Circuit Court of the county or to the
Superior Court of Baltimore City under Md. Code (1939) Art. 5, See. 69.
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Article 5 of the Code, which provides: "If upon an appeal
being entered in the Orphans' Court, the parties shall
mutually agree, and enter their consent in writing, to be
filed by the register of wills, that the appeal shall be made
to the Circuit Court for the county, or the Superior Court
of Baltimore City, the Orphans' Court shall direct the
transcript of the proceedings to be transmitted to the Cir-
cuit Court, or Superior Court, whose decision shall be
final."'5 This statute has only once come to the attention
of the Court of Appeals for construction. 6 It was then
held that the essential element of jurisdiction thereunder
was the assent of the parties; that if the parties chose to
transcribe only a part of the Orphans' Court proceedings,
and to have the original papers transmitted in part, by
pre-arrangement, such fact would have no effect on the
finality of the Circuit or Superior Court's decision on ap-
peal. The assumption was that appeal under this section
is similar to appeal to the Court of Appeals, once the proper
mutual consent is filed, as far as its finality is concerned.
The wording of the statute would seem to allow for no
other interpretation. This fact may well lend considerable
weight to decisions of the Circuit and Superior Courts on
such appeals, under the doctrine of stare decisis.
Aside from this, it is submitted that the opinion derives
considerable force from the thoroughness and excellence
of its own analysis. It would seem that its conclusions
.could be taken as law likely to be followed because they
have been drawn with such careful consideration of the
state of authority elsewhere, the wording of our own
statutes, and the policy of our laws; and also because the
decision resting on such conclusions was a final disposition
of the litigation in hand.
"r Italics supplied.
-State, use of Wilson, v. McCarty, 64 Md. 253, 260, 1 A. 116, 119-120
(1885).
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